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PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY" 
I N HIS Voyage of the  Beagle Darwin recorded his impres- sions of Tiema del Fuego and its natives. There he found 
a communistic society, untroubled by conceptions of private 
property. A piece of cloth given as a present was promptly 
torn into strips and distributed; there was no hoarding; this 
was the most primitive society in the great naturalist's ex- 
perience. As there was no property, there was no theft-a 
conclusive proof that civilisation had not even begun. We 
may parallel this with stages in the evolution of a human 
being. The infant, tired of a toy, cheerfully throws it out of 
his perambulator; a few years later, when he stores his toys 
in a cupboard, and dutifully inserts coins in his money box, 
his parents conclude that he is growing up. The boy's posses- 
sions are colltributing to this process; from the sense of own- 
ness, or individuality. Then, when the boy receives monetary 
presents, he will be likely to keep them in separate pockets, 
intending to devote each to a distinct purpose; he would be 
confused if told to pool all his assets, and make his payments 
from the total fund. With I~uman beings as with nations, the 
balance sheet is evidence of a very advanced stage of develop- 
ment, for the primitive mind tends to relate each item of in- 
come to a separate expenditure, and these items would ap- 
pear to be lost if they were added up. Property provides, as 
it  were, a modulus by which we can assess the evolution of 
the individual and the civilisation to which he belongs. 
This linking of property with evolution is very ancient. It 
inspired a notable contrast in ancient Greece, when histotle 
defended the institution of private property as an aid to the 
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moral development of his citizen, since it provides opportu- 
nities for exercising the qualities of liberality and restraint; 
while to Plato it appeared that virtue could be fostered only 
in an idealist state where everything was held in common. 
The world is still divided between these opposing views. But 
I am not concerned with this controversy. I am limiting my 
enquiry to one country, England, and almost entirely to the 
period between the Revolution of 1688 and the Reform Bill 
of 1832, a period in which freehold property provided both 
the basis of public life and the criterion of personal status; 
only graduallv, and since the eighteenth century, has status 
ceased to be entirely dependent on property. Conclusions 
similar to those wllich I am going to suggest might be de- 
rived from other countries and other periods, notably from 
the coIoniaI period in American history, in which I am in- 
clined to think that the advance from property to status was 
more rapid than in contemporary England. 
First of all, the word property. We generally derive it from 
the Latin prop~iunz, one's own, something to which one has a 
right. From the start, the material object of possession is con- 
nected with an abstract right. The simplest example of this 
is the adjective proper, here we have detached the rightness 
from the possession; a less obvious example is the word 
propriety, now used excIusiveIy to mean rightness of con- 
duct. Formerly the word had nothing to do with conduct, but 
meant a right-the right to one's property. This is the earliest 
right to be protected by Iaw. Then the word person. I t  is 
derived from the Latin persona, a mask worn by actors on 
the stage, as in the old Latin comedy, and was intended to 
designate the actors, the dramatis personae of the play. 
Whereas, in our modern drama, we tend to show the de- 
velopment of personality from the impact on it of circum- 
stance, in the older drama personality is hardly distinguish- 
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able from character; it is static, and is usually drawn on sim- 
pler and more rigid lines. Next, the word personality. This 
has a long, complicated history, and it cannot be said that 
even the great Oxford Dictionary has been able to elucidate 
it. At times, it appears to be interchangeable with personalty, 
that is, property over which one has power of personal dis- 
position, in contrast with real property over which, for long, 
one's power of disposition was limited. At other times, the 
word appears to mean little more than humanity, in distinc- 
tion from the animal creation on the one hand and the divine 
essence on the other. But, and here I call the Oxford Dic- 
tionaiy to witness, the use of the word personality in our 
modern sense, that is, the consensus of distinctive, subjective 
qualities which distinguish each of us from everyone else, 
this usage does not appear until the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, that is, at the close of the period with 
which I am concerned. 
In  the past, character and disposition were thought of, not 
subjectively, but as linked with material things, such as the 
four hunlours and their proportion in the body; our complex- 
ion, in the broad sense of temperament, was something built 
in, as it were, to be altered only within a limited range. Char- 
acteristically, new habits, such as smoking, were considered 
according as they might alter this chemical balance which 
makes us what we are; naturally, there was disagreement on 
this score, some experts holding that smoking, especially 
when alternated with psalm singing, was a cure for melan- 
choly, a view countered by no less a person than King James 
I, who argued that the contrary is true, because the smoke 
ascends to the brain, where it  distils into liquids, thus in- 
creasing the watery content of the body, and so disposing to 
melancholy. In passing, it may be noted that the modern 
science of Biochemistry has restored interest in this old doc- 
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trine of humours, by revealing the function of the glandular 
secretions; and we now know that strong emotions, such as 
fear and hate, are accompanied by chemical reactions. For 
our purposes, the interest of the old doctrine of humours is 
that, as so often, matters which we regard as subjective were 
closely related to purely objective things. But, even more 
interesting than these changes of connotation, is a curious 
gap-the absence of our word status, in its ordinaly, non- 
medical meaning, until about 1790, when, according to the 
Oxford Dictionary, it was used by Boswell in referring to the 
status of the negro slave. Even as late as the early decades of 
the nineteenth century the word was considered unusual 
when appIied to the place held by an individual among his 
fellow men. Moreover, the word status was uilknown to the 
old common law. After the Dissolution of the hIonasteries by 
Henry VIII, a statute gave to the ejected monks and nuns 
the right to sue and to be sued, the only approacll that I can 
find, in our Ancient Regime, to our modern conception of 
status. 
Now, a gap of such dimensions raises a number of impor- 
tant questions. What filled it? Did the church and the canon 
law, by their emphasis on Christian duty and the transistori- 
ness of human life provide an other-worldly conception of 
status? I think that this is possible; certainly the church mod- 
ified the old materialist and semi-pagan conception of crime 
by introducing t l ~ e  lenlent of moral guilt. But I am inclined 
to think that the greater part of the gap was filled by prop- 
erty, particuIar1y landed property, and by the rights, usualIy 
exclusive and personal, which derived from property. As 
contrasted with Roman Law, the feudal law of western 
Europe was distinguished by a clear contrast between realty 
and personalty, of which the former was much the more im- 
portant, because it provided the basis of the state. Land had 
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a pre-eminence not accorded to ~ersonal property; it was the 
source of food and the unit for the provision of armed de- 
fenders. True, there were merchants and towns and accumu- 
lated treasure, but these were still only on the margin of 
feudal society, and existed, as it were, on sufferance. But at 
this point another distinction must be made. In medieval 
England there were no landowners, in our sense of the word, 
except possibly the king; the members of what we call the 
landed classes were really tenants of an overlord, holding 
ultimately of the king. Most of then1 held by knight service 
having to provide a number of fully-armed knights in pro- 
portion to the extent of their holding; and in this way, feudal 
society was a hierarchy, each unit bound to the other by 
duties and rights; personal obligation was inseparably tied 
to landed possession or occupation. Service, not ownership, 
was at  its basis; its motto might have been: 'In this service 
is perfect freedom.' 
In this delicately-poised structure, where everyone had a 
clearly defined place, and therefore some kind of status, 
things did not get busy until the tenant died. Thereupon the 
king or overlord stepped in. Was the widow marriageable? 
If so, a suitable marriage could be arranged for a normal fee, 
and an unsuitable one for an abnormal fee. Was t11e heir 
under age? Then a guardian would have to be appointed for 
his custody and for the management of his lands, with annual 
fees for that. Both widow and heir were regarded, not as 
persons, but almost as ai-ticles of property, which might be 
sold or bartered for pro&; a courtier might solicit the king for 
profitable widows and wards, as if they were mineral rights 
to be exploited. The system worked only if the king or 
suzerain had some gentlemanly instincts; he might be a vil- 
lain, but usually he was a straightforward, outdoors villain. 
I t  was king John, the first indoor villain among English kings, 
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who upset the system by abusing his rights over the defence- 
less wards and widows; and it was in this roundabout way 
that Magna Carta came to be the foundation of our liberties 
in England and the United States. 
As early as the Hundred Years War the military element 
in this system had become obsolete, as kings hired merce- 
naries; but lands continued to  be held by knight service. So 
far from abolishing the system, Henry VIII capitalised it, by 
erecting the Court of Wards which imposed a system of per- 
sonal surveillance and monetary exactions falling on the large 
class which still held of the crown. Then, in the seventeenth 
centusy, with the forfeitures entailed by the Civil Wars, 
many Puritans obtained large blocks of land cheaply, and 
meanwhile the Court of Wards had fallen into desuetude. It 
was abolished by statute in 1660, together with all the chival- 
rous tenures of the crown. In  effect, therefore, tenants had 
now become owners; they had emancipated themselves, 
without cost, from both the old burden of military service, 
with the personal disabilities falling on their widows and 
children, and from the more recent exactions imposed by 
Henry VIII's Court of Wards. Here is the beginning of the 
modern English freeholder, of the landed class as we h o w  it 
today. Copyhold tenure, the descendant of the old villeinage, 
was left untouched, and survived until 1925, when it was 
converted into freehold. At the threshold of our period, there- 
fore, the freeholder and copyholder were the standard, ac- 
credited units on the land; by contrast, the landless man, the 
wage labourer, the cottager, the openfielder, as they had no 
land, had no status. They could be exploited or evicted. By 
the end of the seventeenth century, when the population of 
England was just over Gve millions, the landless, rightless 
element numbered nearly three millions. A century later, 
when the population had doubled, there was more pressure 
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on the privileged centre from the increasingly large outer 
ring of the unenfranchised-the unskined workers, the paid 
labourers, the cottagers, the ordinary soldiers and sailors, the 
unemployed, a vast part of the population, conveniently de- 
scribed as the "poor." 
This privileged minority, the landed freeholders, repre- 
sented what we might call a hangover from the gradual dis- 
solution of the feudal structure. Their counterparts were to 
be found in the incorporated towns, where there had long 
existed a privileged class of artisans who, after seven years 
servitude as apprentices, acquired the "freedom" of their 
craft or borough-a freedom which meant that they could 
have the law on any unqualified intruder who tried to set up 
shop in their midst. As on the land, freedom was associated 
with emancipation-in the one case, from the service of 
tenure, in the other case from the service of apprenticeship; 
and emancipation brought with it freedom in the sense of 
privilege or monopoly. So too in the learned professions. The 
church, the law and medicine were composed of practitioners 
who, having fulfilled the requirements for qualification, en- 
joyed a status to which definite privileges were attached. Ac- 
cordingly, after about 1660, English society was grouped 
round a hard core, consisting of king and peerage, landed 
freeholders, copyholders and leaseholders, authenticated 
members of the learned professions, workers who had ac- 
quired the freedom of their craft, all of them deriving status 
from property, or from exclusive rights associated with prop- 
erty. All of these may be regarded as full citizens. They 
monopolised the franchise; from them were recruited the 
politicians and statesmen; they served on juries; if they were 
Anglicans, they might hold public office; they were exempt 
from compulsory military or naval service. They were not 
necessarily the wealthiest elements in the community, as 
The Rice Institute PamphIet 
some merchants were much better off than landowners; the 
distinction between them was much more ancient and subtle 
than any economic difference. The landed freeholder was not 
class-conscious, for the reason that his was the only class. 
Nor was he merely selfish, for he paid the bulk of the direct 
taxation, which fell almost exclusively on land. As the eight- 
eenth century advanced, the landed class became more ob- 
viously a minority, but a minority which set a high standard 
in parliamentary oratory, in patronage of art and letters and 
music, in the achievements of architecture, in all the refine- 
ments and amenities of life, the things which make this 
period so delightful for posterity to contemplate. I t  was in 
1765 that Sir William Blackstone began his codification of 
the Iaws of this minority civilisation. Here is the summing up 
of his philosophy of history:- 
Had not a separate property in lands as well as movables 
been vested in some individuals, the world would have con- 
tinued a forest, and men would have been animals of prey; 
which, according to some philosophers is the genuine state of 
nature. Whereas now (so graciously has Providence inter- 
woven our duty and happiness together) the result of this 
very necessity has been the ennobling of the human species, 
by giving it opportunities of improving its rational faculties, 
as well as of exerting its natural. Necessity begat property; 
and, in order to ensure that property, recourse was had to 
civil society, which brought along with it a long train of 
inseparable concomitants; states, governments, laws, punish- 
ments and the public exercise of religious duties. Thus, con- 
nected together, it was found that a part only of society was 
sufficient to provide, by its manual labour, for the necessary 
subsistence of all; and leisure was given to others to cultivate 
the human mind, to invent useful arts, and to lay the founda- 
tions of science. 
F& statements could better illustrate the complacency so 
characteristic of eighteenth-century mentality. Moreover 
Blackstone's analysis is as notable for what it omits as for 
what it says. I t  omits the fact that the labouring classes were 
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in a great majority; that they were denied most of the rights 
of citizenship; and that, in war time, they had to provide, 
compulsoriIy, the naval and militaiy service. 
Before the great legal changes of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, landed property in England exemplified 
same of the characteristics of a small, stable, ~atriarchal so- 
ciety. On the principle that the land must go to the heir, the 
freeholder's land could not be touched by creditors of the 
deceased; the creditors must recoup themselves from the per- 
sonalty. The wives and widows of the landowning class were 
protected, as no other elements in society were protected, 
from the danger of falling into penury by institutions such as 
the dower whereby, on marriage, the husband created a 
landed endowment, usually for the joint lives of husband 
and wife, with remainder to the widow. Even the humble 
copyholder might secure a similar protection for his widow, 
for she might enjoy the copyhold during her widowhood as 
a right of "frankbench." These rights of widows could be en- 
joyed only so long as they remained unmarried and chaste. 
In private law, therefore, land was the medium by which one 
provided for one's widow and descendants; though in Eng- 
land the principle of primogeniture encouraged the younger 
sons to embark on a profession or engage in overseas trade. 
Indirectly, i t  was the long war against Louis XIV which 
created an alternative to land as a means of safeguarding 
one's dependents and successors. That war necessitated the 
raising of large sums by national loans, some of them for as 
long as 99 years; the investor in such loans could therefore 
provide for his dependents a security which formerly was 
available only for the landed classes. 
How were the lower classes affected by this system? By 
the end of the eighteenth century there were about 200 
felonies, all punishable by death and confiscation of goods. 
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Most of these felonies arose from violation of property rights, 
including the theft of five shillings. To-day we find it diffi- 
cult to understand how such brutal penalties were imposed 
for almost trivial offences; but some responsible contempo- 
raries expressed the view that this savage protection of 
property was proof, not of brutality, but of the high level 
of English civilisation. Protection of property always comes 
before protection of the person, if only because inanimate 
things cannot defend themselves; often the person was pro- 
tected solely because of his property. Take, for example, the 
abduction of a woman. If she had no landed property, the 
abductor could go ahead, as there was no law to stop him; 
but if she had landed property of a certain minimum value, 
then her abduction was felony, punishable by death. Take 
the case of a servant or apprentice who is so grievously 
assaulted by an intruder that he is unable to work for some 
time. In this case it is the master who has the action-a 
property action-against the assailant, not for personal in- 
juries, but for the material loss consequent on the servant's 
enforced absence from work. Take an escaped negro slave. 
His owner might wage an action of troves or trespass against 
the person harbouring him. Of all this, the woman provided 
the clearest illustration. As a child, she was subordinate to 
her father. On marriage, she was given away by one man to 
another man. As a married woman, she retained cei-tain re- 
stricted rights over her real estate, but her personal property, 
including money, jewels and even the clothes she wore, she 
surrendered to her husband. In  giving up her personalty she 
gave up her personality. But the odds were not all against 
her. Often she made up for her rightlessness with her tongue, 
to such an extent indeed, that, in the past, silent women were 
at a premium; and you will recall King Lear's words of 
Cordelia: 'her voice was ever soft, an excellent thing in 
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woman.' Moreover she might contract debts for which her 
husband alone was responsible. If he was unable to pay, he 
went to the debtors' prison, not as a p~xnishment, but on the 
principle that his body provided security for the debt-one 
more illustration of the subordination of the person to 
property, 
In the theory of the state, as in the principles of private 
law, property had the same dominance. Locke maintained 
that the main function of the state was to protect rights of 
property, in which, however, he included life and liberty. 
Hume maintained that as justice consists in rendering unto 
every man his due, this quality is conceivable only where 
there is property. As property was inseparable from justice, 
so it was inseparable from liberty. This may seem para- 
doxical to us. An illustration was provided in 1712 when a 
statute imposed a freel~old qualification of the value of at 
least £300 per anaum on all burgesses in the Commons. 
Now this was a perversion of the old constitution of parlia- 
ment. Historically, the knights of the shire had represented 
land, while the burgesses, originally townsmen, were sup- 
posed to represent trade. By this statute, the burgesses are 
added to the landed representation; in effect, also, this meas- 
ure excluded a number of rich merchants from the Com- 
mons. We today would regard this as a narrowing and even 
weakening of the legislative body. But contemporaries took 
the opposite view, for the preamble to this statute stated 
that, by this landed requirement, the liberty of parliament 
would be more adequately secured. Liberty against what? 
Against the prerogative which, in continental countries, 
could ride rougl~sl~od over representative institutions be- 
cause there the third estate was a true estate, consisting only 
of townsmen and burgesses, who were powerless because 
they did not have the backing of land, The same situation-the 
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social and political monopoly of the landed freeholder-can 
often be paralleled In the history of the thirteen American 
colonies. 
It is obvious that such a deeply-rooted system was not 
likely to disappear overnight. When was it first challenged? 
I think that the first challenge came in 1753 in the fierce de- 
bates, in both Houses, over Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Bill. 
To-day we regard that Bill as reasonable and salutary be- 
cause it tightened up the law of marriage, mainly by requir- 
ing the publication of banns and the performance of the 
ceremony in a place of public worship. This was intended to 
obviate the irregular and secret marriages by which women of 
a certain class lured wealthy young heirs into n~atrimony. But 
the opponents of the measme contended that the Act was 
designed solely in the interests of the propertied classes, and 
was unfair to the poor, because of the fees which had now to 
be paid. For perhaps the first time in the Ancien R6gime 
there were brought into sharp contrast these two conceptions 
of marriage-the one based on ilatural inclination, intended 
to meet a human need; the other based on prudence or cal- 
culation, intended to retain large possessions in the same 
social class. Hence, advocacy of the repeal of the Marriage 
Act urged, later in the century by C. J. Fox, was regarded as 
a popular, even radical refo~m. In  this way, public attention 
was focused, for the first time, on what now seems to us a 
monopolist, exclusive element in the constitution of the older 
English society, but it was long before freelzold lost its 
prerogative. 
What factors favoured this long, silent revolution whereby 
the basic structure of English society was slowly trans- 
formed? There were many. Great wars, as usual, made their 
contribution, notably the War of the American Revolution, 
followed so quickly by the Jacobinism of the French Revo- 
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Iution. The Industrial Revolution greatIy increased the pres- 
sure from the unenfranchised, outer ring. The Dissenters, 
from Defoe at the beginning the century to Priestley and 
Price at the end, waged war on the rampart of privilege. The 
movement for prison reform, led by Howard, prepared the 
way for other humanitarian measures, such as the abolition 
of the Slave Trade, the abolition of slavery in the colonies, 
and the drastic reform of the penal code. The Reform Bill of 
1832 was only the first step in the process of parliamentary 
enfranchisement; at long last, in 1848, with the abolition of 
the Corn Laws, the prerogative of the landed freeholder tvas 
sei-iously undermined. All these movements, spread over a 
long period, had this in common that they were directed to 
the emancipation of the common man, unendowed with 
property. 
This newly discovered humanity found expression in many 
forms. The Dissenters, from their position on the margin of 
society, could see things in a perspective unattainable by 
those in the privileged, central enclosure; they were behind 
practically all the progressive and humanitarian movements. 
The Methodists introduced an introspective and even spirit- 
ual elenlent into the lives of the underdogs, by insisting that 
God cared for them, not collectively and abstractly, but per- 
sonaIIy and individually; indeed, Wesley's popular liymn 
'Jesus, lover of my soul' provided the antithesis to the older 
conception of the Diety, whose function was held to be that 
of prese~ving in the existing order and keeping the poor in 
their place. Moreover, in the century and a half after 1688 
men were becoming less tl~eological, but not less religious; 
and the absence of plague after 1665 served to diminish the 
force of the old argument that disease and famine, like ty- 
rannical government, are sent by God to punish us for 
atheism and debauchely. Parallel wit11 this recession of dog- 
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matism, there was a new type of philosophy, developed 
mainly by Locke and Hume which, by focusing attention 
on the problem of the links between sensation and experi- 
ence on the one hand and intellectual processes on the other, 
brought into greater prominence the subjective element in 
man. Another iduence was that of women. Thougl~ still de- 
nied legal rights, they experienced a social emancipation 
which brought them to a nearer equality with man, particu- 
larly educated men. Generally, they helped to diminish the 
pedantry, the acerbity, the coarseness of the old man-made 
society; often their commonsense realism provided a correc- 
tive to the egotism of the male. Finally, in this enumeration 
of less obvious movements in English life, I would include 
smoking, which steadily increased in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Call it a drug or a poison if you like; 
but it did help to mitigate the uncompromising angularity 
of the older world and to foster, as by a sedative, the spirit 
of concession and compromise. I t  is possible that, if Charles I 
or even Archbishop Laud had been in the habit of smoking a 
pipe, there would have been no Civil War. A civilisation 
without nicotine may be highly virtuous and exemplary, per- 
mitting no compron~ise with sin or error; it will abound in 
saints and rigosists, but also in martyrs and massacres. 
My own impression is that today human personality is 
richer and deeper than it ever was before. My evidence may 
not be very convincing, but here it is. First of all, modern 
portraits often reveal more complicated and developed per- 
sonalities than are shown by those of the past, in which a cer- 
tain rigidity, or angularity or even tenseness can often be 
detected. Also, there is, I think, general agreement that, at 
least among the English-speaking people, there is now a 
higher standard of honour and of humour. As regards 
honour, formerly men stood on their oath, with the result 
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that oath breaking became a habit; today we all stand on 
our honour, and that cannot be violated wit11 impunity. Then 
as regards the sense of humour. Originally, humour meant 
one of the four humours, and had nothing to do with our 
sense of the incongruous or irrational, based on an apprecia- 
tion of balance and perspective. Our sense of humour today 
is incompatible with the coarse practical joke, but it is not 
incompatible with tears, which may provide a catharsis, as 
we contemplate, with amused sadness, the follies of human 
life, including our own. In this sense humour means a sense 
of proportion and a spirit of toleration. The dangerous na- 
tions are those which have no sense of humour. 
I am suggesting that personality has gradually evolved 
from property through the intermediate stage of status. That 
our conception of personality today is much richer and 
more complicated than in the past is evidenced in the great 
increase in the number of words used for the analysis and 
description of the many shades of character and tempera- 
ment. Here I am not thinking of new or coined words, such 
as one finds in modern psychology; I have in mind old, re- 
spectable words, originally used of inanimate or barely ani- 
mate objects, and now used also in a referred and subjective 
sense. A simple example is the word 'starchy7 to describe a 
straight-laced inflexible person. This word was made possible 
by the introduction of starch into England from Holland in 
the later sixteenth century. Astronomy provides some such 
words, as martial, saturnine and loony; medicine supplies 
others, as phlegmatic, lymphatic, sanguine and sardonic- 
the last, a useful word, derived from the riacs sardonicus, or 
involuntary and ghastly grin produced by the facial muscles 
in some cases of poisoning as, in ancient times, by a herb 
found in Sardinia. The words cynical and stoical recall Greek 
philosophy, The word tolerant is useful for my purpose. 
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Originally, it meant tolerant of something material, such as a 
poison or hard work or exposure; not till the nineteenth cen- 
tury did it come to mean tolerant of other people's opinions. 
We know that the words honour and humour have many old 
significations, but it is not till the nineteenth century that we 
find the expressions 'a sense of humour' and 'a sense of 
honour.' Always, in the vocabulary which I have in mind, 
there has been an advance fmm the objective to the subjec- 
tive, in order to meet the demands in our vastly more com- 
plicated diagnosis of personality. So great are these demands 
that we are even obliged to appropriate words from other 
countries, notably Scotland, where harsh conditions and an 
unusually perceptive peasantry helped to enrich the vocabu- 
lary with words denoting the various shades of caution, and 
sarcasm-not an unkindly sarcasm, but the expression of a 
somewhat di5dent and critical attitude, contrasted with that 
prevailing in more prosperous England, where rank and 
wealth have always been regarded with greater awe. Ex- 
amples are the words canny, cosy, feckless and pawky. Of 
these, the last exemplifies a typically Scottish attitude; but I 
can best illustrate it by an example not from Scotland, but 
from Texas. In Austin, as you know, the University of Texas 
is very large, and accordingly deaths among its senior mem- 
bers are regrettably but inevitably frequent. So the Aag 
on the campus flag staff is often at half mast. Recently, two 
senior and very distinguished professors happened to meet 
under the flag staff. Number One, pointing to the flag at half 
mast, remarked: 'A lot of deaths recently.' 'Yes,' replied num- 
ber two, 'but they are always the wrong ones.' That remark 
revealed a pawky character. 
I11 conclusion, it must be obvious to all who have read thus 
far that the subject is full of unsolved probIen~s-proble~ns 
shelved or obscused by modern Psychology, which explains 
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so much by the use of an entirely new and impressive termi- 
nology. The study of the evolution of human personality has 
thus been side-tracked by a new approach. I am well aware 
that, when we speak of the more highly developed person- 
ality of modern man, this may mean no more tllan that, like 
the physician, we have now a better technique for diagnosis; 
just as the doctor identifies and names diseases, existing at 
all times, but never before classified, so we may be merely 
applying a larger vocabulary for description of what has al- 
ways been there, On the other hand, there may have been 
actual development, just as new disorders and new tolerances 
are created by new conditions. I have expressed the view 
that, historically, tllere has been an enlarging and deepening 
of human personality, in at least the western hemisphere, 
mainly through the intermediate stages of property and 
status. Of the factors which have promoted this evolution I 
regard Christianity as the most potent and the most com- 
plicated-complicated because Christian doctrine has itself 
experienced an evolution, which has resulted in a division 
into different and even hostile camps. Nevertheless, in spite 
of these differences, I think that the western, or a t  least the 
Anglo-Saxon mentality is distinguishable from both the 
Ancient and the Oriental mentality-distinguishable is per- 
haps too mild a word. The late Lord Curzon once publicly 
proclaimed that there are two kinds of truth, westem and 
oriental, the first being vastly superior to the second; but, 
while few of us have either the courage or the social status 
necessary for such pronouncements, we may feel that His 
Lordship was giving a clear and downright answer to one 
of the many questions implicit in this essay. 
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